CREDIT RISK PREFERENCE IN E-FINANCE: AN  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF P2P LENDING by Zhang, Zhensheng
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
PACIS 2014 Proceedings Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems(PACIS)
2014
CREDIT RISK PREFERENCE IN E-FINANCE:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF P2P LENDING
Zhensheng Zhang
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore, Singapore, zhang@nus.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2014
This material is brought to you by the Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been
accepted for inclusion in PACIS 2014 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Zhang, Zhensheng, "CREDIT RISK PREFERENCE IN E-FINANCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF P2P LENDING" (2014).
PACIS 2014 Proceedings. 197.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2014/197
 
 
CREDIT RISK PREFERENCE IN E-FINANCE: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF P2P LENDING 
Zhensheng Zhang, National University of Singapore, Singapore, zhang@nus.edu.sg 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Online P2P lending marketplaces match individual lenders and borrowers for unsecured loans via 
real-time auction without financial institutions as an intermediary. This paper aims to build up a 
theoretical framework from the perspectives of informational social influence and herding behavior to 
explain how individual investors’ participation of online financial community influence their credit 
risk preference in online P2P lending marketplaces under different financial situations. The research 
proposes that online financial community participants’ credit risk preference is higher than 
non-participants in investment decision making during non-financial crisis period, whereas online 
financial community participants’ credit risk preference is lower than non-participants during 
financial crisis period. This research plans to conduct a field study to test the proposed effect by 
examining individual investors’ real transaction data on Prosper.com during financial crisis period 
and non-financial crisis period as well as their membership records on the community of 
Prospers.org. An analytical model will be further estimated to test the proposition. 
Keywords: E-finance, P2P lending, Online P2P lending marketplace, Credit risk preference, 
Individual investment, Online financial community, Financial situation, Financial crisis, 
Non-financial crisis. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, online P2P (Peer-to-Peer) lending transactions have flourished on the Internet, despite the 
global financial crisis. Online P2P lending marketplaces, such as Prosper.com (www.prosper.com), 
match individual lenders and borrowers directly for unsecured loans via real-time auction. The 
emerging financial service may generate significant savings in operation costs, which leads to lower 
interest rates for individual borrowers and higher returns for individual lenders (Freedman & Jin 
2011). Meanwhile, lenders must face credit risk in online P2P lending marketplaces. The credit risk 
arises from the uncertainty over the borrowers’ repayment cash flow of principal and interest of loans 
(Morris & Shin 2009). In this study, credit risk refers to the risk of default by individual loan 
borrowers in online P2P lending marketplaces.  
Accompanying with the emergence of P2P lending marketplaces, online financial communities 
consisting of discussion forums have been built up, such as Prospers.org (www.prospers.org). The 
community provides a platform for loans borrowers and lenders on Prosper.com to share information, 
experience and resources with each other. Prior studies show that online community participation may 
influence individual’s learning process as well as consuming behavior (Algesheimer et al. 2005; 
Dellarocas 2003; Kozinets 2002; Turkle 2011). Online community participation also affects 
consumer’s risk-seeking tendency in financial decision making (Zhu et al. 2012). However, less 
attention has been paid to investigate the effect of individual investor’s community participation on 
credit risk preference in online P2P lending marketplaces with regards to distinct financial situations. 
This paper, responding to the call for research, aims to build up a theoretical framework from the 
perspectives of informational social influence and herding behavior to explain, under different 
financial situations (financial crisis vs. non-financial crisis), how individual investor’s financial 
community participation influence credit risk preference in online P2P lending marketplaces. The 
research proposes that online financial community participants’ credit risk preference is higher than 
non-participants in investment decision making during non-financial crisis period, whereas online 
financial community participants’ credit risk preference is lower than non-participants during 
financial crisis period. To address the research question, a field study is planned to test the proposed 
effect by examining individual investors’ real transaction data on Prosper.com and membership 
records on Prospers.org during financial crisis period (October 2007 to December 2008) and 
non-financial crisis period (March 2006 to September 2007). By putting forward the theoretical 
framework and analytical model, this research contributes to the understanding of credit risk 
preference in the emerging financial marketplaces by a comparison under different financial situations 
in terms of financial crisis period and non-financial crisis period. 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Credit Risk Preference 
This study focuses on individual investors’ credit risk preference in online P2P lending marketplaces 
during different financial periods such as financial crisis period and non-financial crisis period. Credit 
risk, as a typical financial risk, is closely related to individual investors’ financial decision making 
(He et al. 2008; Zhou & Pham 2004). Some individual investors exhibit risk seeking preference with 
willingness to take higher risks for greater rewards, whereas others tend to be risk averse by making 
safer investment decision to avoid losses.  Prior research has shown the evidence that individuals’ risk 
preference can be significantly affected by social factors such as membership in a group and the 
group’s cultural values (Sitkin & Pablo 1992). Being group memberships, individuals may prefer 
higher risk when making decision within the group than alone (Blascovich & Ginsburg 1974; Stoner 
1961). Individuals are also found to exhibit risk aversion preference within group (Pilkonis & Zanna 
1973). Thus, it has been recognized that the direction of a group’s influence on individuals’ risk 
preference relies on the risk-taking trends of the group. However, previous studies have paid more 
attention to general risk preference rather than individual investors’ credit risk preference during 
financial decision making towards investment of personal loan. 
 
 
2.2 Informational Social Influence and Herding Behavior 
This research tries to give an explanation from the perspective of informational social influence and 
individual investors’ herding behavior. Informational social influence demonstrates that when 
individuals cannot make appropriate decisions in ambiguous social situations they attempt to assume 
that other members within group possess more accurate information and reflect right behavior for a 
given situation (Aronson et al. 2005). Herding behavior is defined as occurring when individual 
mimics others, ignoring substantive private information (Scharfstein & Stein 1990). Herding 
tendencies may emerge as individual imitates others’ actions by judging that others’ actions contain 
useful information (Keynes 1936; Keynes 1937). Further, individuals may discount private 
information in favour of information about the actions of the herd (Scharfstein & Stein 1990). With 
informational social influence in community, the influence of private information on individuals’ 
decisions is overwhelmed by the influence of public information about the decisions of the 
community, which leads to individuals’ herding behavior (Baddeley et al. 2007). 
 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSITION 
The informational social influence in online financial community can manifest itself among members 
including lenders and borrowers. Lender’s private investment decision in P2P lending marketplaces 
may be implicitly influenced by other lenders or borrowers in online financial community during 
financial crisis situation and non-financial crisis situation.  
Under the situation of financial crisis, pessimistic information may publicly overwhelm the financial 
online community as the economic conditions became deleterious. The public information conveyed 
by the majority of the community turns to be more cautious to make lending decisions and unwilling 
to loan due to high default rate. Individuals who participate in the online community would be 
affected by the informational social influence exerted by the herding behavior and mimics other 
members, such that the individuals are inclined to exhibit lower credit risk preference (i.e. credit risk 
aversion) than non-participants.  
On the contrary, under the situation of non-financial crisis, economic conditions remain healthy and 
public information in online financial community becomes optimistic. The majority of the community 
members are more active to take higher risk for greater rewards, which forms the alternative 
informational social influence within the group. In this case, financial community participants’ private 
investment decisions would be influenced by the optimistic public information conveyed by 
surrounding members, which leads to their higher credit risk preference (i.e. credit risk seeking) than 
non-participants. The theoretical framework of the research is proposed in Figure 1. 
As with the above discussion, this study proposes that credit risk preference of investors who 
participate in online financial community is lower than those who don’t participate in online financial 
community when they make investment decisions in P2P lending marketplaces during financial crisis 
period. In comparison, when making investment decisions in P2P lending marketplaces during 
non-financial crisis period, credit risk preference of investors who participate in online financial 
community is higher than those who don’t participate in online financial community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Theoretical framework 
 
4 METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Research Setting 
The research collects database of P2P auction loans listed on Prosper.com (www.prosper.com) and 
membership records on Prospers.org (www.prospers.org). Prosper.com, founded in the United States 
in 2006, is the world’s largest peer-to-peer lending marketplace with approximately 2.04 million 
members and $718 million personal funded loans (as of November 2013). The lending marketplace 
aims to provide platform for individuals to borrow and lend directly to each other without financial 
intermediaries through peer-to-peer loan auctions. During the loan auction on Prosper.com, borrowers 
submit amount, maximum interest rate and duration of the loan they want to request. Meanwhile, 
lenders make corresponding investment decisions according to their own risk preference and 
borrowers’ credit rates and personal information provided by Prosper.com.  
Prosper.com assigns credit rate to each borrower based on verified personal information and relevant 
documents such as household income, bank accounts, credit score credit-reporting agency and income 
tax returns, as shown in Figure 2. The credit rate ranges from lowest credit risk to highest credit risk 
(i.e. AA, A, B, C, D, E, HR), among which AA indicates borrowers’ lowest loan default rate, and HR 
represents borrowers’ highest loan default rate. With the assigned credit rate on Prosper.com, 
borrowers post loan requests for auction. Lenders are considered to make lending decisions to take 
greater credit risk for greater rewards. Accordingly, lenders’ credit risk preference could be 
operationalized as the degree of risk they take to lend money to borrowers with various credit default 
rates. 
Prospers.org is a free and non-commercial community consisting of discussion forums where 
borrowers and lenders on Prosper.com can gather to share information, experience and resources 
relating to personal loan auction. For instance, borrowers participate in the discussion forums to 
communicate with potential lenders about their credit information, and lenders participate in the 
discussion forums to share lending strategies and individual loan experience. This research focuses on 
Prospers.org to examine individual’s financial community participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Featured loan listing on Prosper.com 
 
4.2 Field Study 
This research plans to conduct a field study with lenders on Prosper.com to test the proposition that 
online financial community participants’ credit risk preference is higher than non-participants in 
investment decision making during non-financial crisis period, whereas online financial community 
participants’ credit risk preference is lower than non-participants in investment decision making 
during financial crisis period.  
The sample of lenders is randomly selected from lenders registered on Prosper.com as of December 
2008, and the lenders’ behaviors are tracked from March 2006 to December 2008 which covers global 
non-financial crisis period (March 2006 to September 2007) and financial crisis period (October 2007 
to December 2008) according to the timeline of overall bursting of the U.S. housing bubble. To 
further check the breakpoint at October 2007, the Chow test will be used in the following regression 
to determine whether the impacts on distinct samples of the lenders are different. This study estimates 
a regression model as the following form to test the proposition: 
Credit Risk Preference = b0 + b1 Community Participation + b2 Financial Situation 
                                 + b3 Community Participation × Financial Situation 
    + b4 Regular Markets Investment 
    + b5 Investment Experience 
    + b6 Education Level 
    + b7 Gender 
    + b8 Age + ε 
 
 
 
Credit risk preference during a single period (non-financial crisis period or financial crisis period) as 
the dependent variable is calculated by summing lenders’ credit rate of each loan weighted by its 
share in the lending portfolio during the single period as the following formula: Credit Risk Preference = ∑ Credit Risk Rate𝑖 ×  Share𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  
Where i represents lenders’ each loan during the single period; Credit Risk Ratei is credit rate 
assigned to each loan; Sharei is the proportion of loan i in lender’s lending portfolio during the single 
period. The study will collect data from Prosper.com for the dependent variable including 1) 
percentage of each lending amount on total lending amount during non-financial crisis period or 
financial crisis period; 2) credit rate to each loan made by lender (i.e., AA, A, B, C, D, E, HR). 
Accordingly, the average credit risk rates for Prosper rating are 0-1.99% for AA loan, 2-3.99% for A 
loan, 4-5.99% for B loan, 6-8.99% for C loan, 9-11.99% for D loan, 12-14.99% for E loan, and ≥15% 
for HR loan (http://www.prosper.com/invest/how-to-invest/prosper-ratings/). To facilitate calculation, 
the study employs mean value of each loan type (i.e. 1% for AA loan, 3% for A loan, 5% for B loan, 
7.5% for C loan, 10.5% for D loan, 13.5% for E loan, and 15% for HR loan).  
This study operationalizes lenders’ community participation as a predictor by examining whether the 
lender belonged to the community of Prospers.org during non-financial crisis period or financial crisis 
period (‘1’ as community participation, ‘0’ as community non-participation), and incorporates 
financial situation period as proposed moderating variable (‘1’ as financial crisis situation, ‘0’ as 
non-financial crisis situation). The effects of several independent variables are controlled in this study. 
The lenders may invest on regular markets other than P2P marketplaces. The regular markets 
investment is considered to impact lenders’ online investment behavior. In this sense, the variable of 
regular markets investment is measured as the ratio of investment size of regular markets to P2P 
marketplaces. Investment experience is related to the range of years of investment experience. The 
lenders with different investment experience may show distinct lending behaviors and credit risk 
preference even if they are facing the similar scenario. Education level is controlled to represent 
lenders’ formal education experience from low to high. Lenders’ gender and age will also be collected 
in the following phase to make the analytical model more comprehensive.  
5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
For this study, it is necessary to rule out self-selection bias originated from the fact that lenders who 
join online financial community prefer higher credit risk than those who do not join during 
non-financial crisis period, or lenders who join online financial community prefer lower credit risk 
than those who do not join during financial crisis period. However, it is not feasible to compare 
lenders’ difference of credit risk preference before and after they join the online financial community 
because lenders tend to join the online community right after they join the lending marketplace, such 
that there lacks lending records before lenders join the online financial community. It is also difficult 
to apply techniques of propensity score matching and instrumental variables to solve the self-selection 
bias for the reason that no variable is available to affect lenders’ decision to join the online 
community rather than their credit risk preference.  
To this end, a lab study is being planned to test whether participants’ prior credit risk preference 
determines their joining the online community. The participants will be asked to imagine that they 
lend on Prosper.com, and trained to access the lending website. Then, Prospers.org as online financial 
community will be introduced to the participants, and the participants will be asked for their 
willingness to join the community and the perceived helpfulness of the community. After that, a likert 
scale will be used to measure the participants’ prior credit risk preference related to financial 
investment (Carducci & Wong 1998). Then, the study will regress participants’ willingness to join the 
community on score of prior credit risk preference to test whether prior credit risk preference predicts 
participants’ perceived helpfulness of the online financial community. 
 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
This research aims to build up a theoretical framework from the perspectives of informational social 
influence and herding behavior to explain how individual investors’ financial community participation 
influence credit risk preference in online P2P lending marketplaces under different financial situations 
including financial crisis and non-financial crisis. The research proposes that online financial 
community participants’ credit risk preference is higher than non-participants in investment decision 
making during non-financial crisis period, whereas online financial community participants’ credit 
risk preference is lower than non-participants in investment decision making during financial crisis 
period. 
The research plans to conduct a field study to address the question. The field study tests the stated 
proposition by examining individuals’ real transaction data on Prosper.com during financial crisis 
period (October 2007 to December 2008) and non-financial crisis period (March 2006 to September 
2007), and individuals’ membership records on the online financial community of Prospers.org. By 
comparing the distinct financial situations including financial crisis period and non-financial crisis 
period, this research puts forward the theoretical framework and analytical model. Accordingly, this 
research contributes to an in-depth understanding the individuals’ credit risk preference in emerging 
financial marketplaces. 
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